Abstract-This document is both a synthesis of current notions about complex systems, and a practical approach description. A disambiguation is proposed and exposes possible reasons for controversies related to causation and emergence. Theoretical considerations about simulations are presented. A justification is then given for the development of practical tools and techniques for the investigation of complex systems. A methodology for the usage of these tools is finally suggested, illustrated by related previous work application examples.
Introduction
One main idea about complex systems is that they can be observed at different levels of investigation. For example, we can observe the world at the levels of atoms, or at the level of human interactions. Problematics are then often related to how a phenomena at a "higher" level is related to the "lower" level, whatever this means depending on the definitions of the "levels". This is also known as micro to macro relationships, or local to global. The other way around is also considered: What can be deduced from the global investigations on the micro effects? More details and commonly considered frameworks will be presented in the next section, which will consist in refining the main concepts and ideas related to "emergence".
These main ideas may seem a legitimate object of study, but the wide range of application domains they're supposedly applicable to makes it difficult to synthesize results into a consistent framework. Attempts at creating a theory of emergent phenomena often end up having to define concepts that are specific to that attempt. Consequently, there are as many definitions as frameworks, and no real common theory.
This document is not a proposal to create yet another framework. The main goal is to justify and understand why and how investigation tools could help better analyze the current observations. Hopefully, these tools will help with the better characterization of the different processes involved in what we call emergent phenomena, which in turn may lead to a better theoretical analysis. After all, this is a traditional process in the history of science: progress is closely linked to the development of new instruments and investigation tools, and there is no reason to think this will be different for complexity and emergence.
Jochen Fromm suggests in [1] that the difficulty to study emergence in a system is equivalent to the difficulty to create a higher-level theory for that system. This document reuses and extend this idea in the light of what could help for such a study. Theoretical considerations are first presented, which then lead to the justification for a methodological and practical approach. Ideally the goal is to identify what could help for the scientific formalization of laws and theories about a given system. This document is meant as a modest first step in that direction.
Therefore, this expose concentrates on investigation tools that will help in studying more aspects of the phenomena we classify as emergent or complex. In addition, and as is historically often the case, the tools developed for such a goal may be worth using in themselves, for different reasons than a theory of complexity. Thus the choice was also made to concentrate on practical problems: prediction and control in complex systems.
Besides this call for practical investigation techniques, it's worth noting what are the previous work in the domain and what are the main challenges to consider. The next section investigates some current frameworks proposed for self-organization and emergence, and possible reasons for associated controversies. The goal is not to engage in a philosophical debate about the merits of such or such framework and take position. The goal is to identify what are the main notions and what they entail. This helps avoid controversies, and some well-defined basis is necessary for a sound future work. A theoretical contribution concerning the potential of simulations is also provided in section 2.7.
Section 3 will present an illustration for different possible approaches. In particular, attention is given to top-down global control and bottom-up micro control. It will also be explained why formalizing higher-levels as their own independent frameworks can help in increasing this control, as well as why it allows to make reasonable predictions about a system. Finally, it is discussed how to extend these ideas, and a synthesis and generalization is done in section 4 for further work.
Review of emergence related concepts
This section reviews different concepts related to emergence. The main goal is to clarify these notions and to pose a framework for the further sections of this proposal, but this section is also the occasion to synthesize previous work and present an original comprehensive digest. The intent is to remain factual and not to engage in the many controversies surrounding these emergence related concepts. A more engaged theoretical discussion and personal contribution will be presented at the end of this section, especially concerning simulations. Justification will then be given for the choice of a practical approach for the investigation of emergent phenomena.
Foreword: the tricky concept of causality
Emergence is related to (and perhaps defined by) identifying the "cause" of higher-level phenomena with respect to a lower-level framework (ex: the laws of physics). Mark Bedau [2] states that emergent properties without causal powers would be mere epiphenomena. Russ Abbott in [3] states In short, we define epiphenomenal and emergent to be synonyms, but then he puts the debate between "reductionists" and "functionalists": As we'll see below, this is in fact a debate around causality. A Wikipedia entry [4] comments that a neutral definition is notoriously hard to provide since every aspect of causation has received substantial debate.
Many if not all emergence-related concepts in the next subsections refer to causation (causal reductionism, downward causation, etc.). A great part of the controversies surrounding these concepts simply arises from the lack of common definition for causation, as in the aforementioned debate between reductionists and functionalists. Such misunderstandings are unfortunately commonly due to the natural language lack of precision concerning causality. This foreword is an attempt at disambiguation, and a clarification necessary for the following subsections.
Emmeche et al [5] have applied to emergence frameworks the four Aristotelian concepts of causation, then summarized as:
• Efficient causality: The notion that something implies, entails, or brings about something else.
• Material causality: The notion that something is made of something else. Note that "matter", as in material, has the broader sense of "composition" here.
• Formal causality: The structure or the form of something, like a house is defined by it's architecture.
• Functional causality, which replaces finality in Aristotelian terms: the role played by something (in relation to something else). So, for example, discussions about an alarm clock may refer to the formal causality (the clock internal plan, why it works), functional causality (what the clock is used for, why it was built), material causality (the clock composition, why it exists at all), and efficient causality (the clock is the cause of the sound that is itself the cause of the observer waking up).
Many apparent controversies end as soon as the notions of causality are refined. For example: "The whirlpool causes the water molecules to move in a restricted way" versus "Water molecules and heat processes amongst other things, are the cause of what we perceive and define as a whirlpool". In this case, the first statement would be an efficient causality (the restriction) between objects defined functionally and formally (the whirlpool and the water molecule movements). The second statement is about an object defined materially (the whirlpool). Natural language only is the source for a possible confusion: Applying the efficient causality of the first statement to the whirlpool of the second statement is meaningless and should be discarded as such (from the second point of view, the restrictions are part of the definition, not a consequence).
There is no guarantee the four distinctions above are exhaustive and adequate to represent all cases. In other words, it's very probable there are even more confusions possible, in examples more contrived than the aforementioned one. Further refinements could be made using notions like time dependency, what is required for objects to be comparable, probabilities, and more 1 . Modern physics must deal with the quantum principle of no local reality and Bell's inequality violation, combined to the no communication principle, so as to avoid a time travel paradox in general relativity. The no local reality is in apparent contradiction with material causality, the no communication principle restricts efficient causality. Measurements may become important, since they can provide an objective source of investigation for material causality. But unfortunately, as mentioned in [6] , a measurement is only defined by the function of the measuring device: to provide a number, that is interpreted in the light of a theory. The theory then itself provides formal causality between the measurements, by way of its laws. As we see, the problem of causality is intrinsically linked to the problem of material objectivity.
The following subsections introduce concepts frequently linked to emergence. They use one form of causation or another. Most of the controversies (ex about downward causation) concern which form of causation to use. For the purpose of this proposal, the goal is not to engage in a philosophical debate, but rather to identify which of these concepts and their associated controversies could be of any use in practice.
Supervenience and identity
Supervenience is concerned by a logical dependence between properties. Assuming properties A and B are defined, A supervenes on B means that each time entities differ with respect to property A, they also differ in property B. This means no two entities may have the same B without having the same A. The difference is purely theoretical: whether we have the means of investigating this difference or not is out of topic for supervenience. The supervenience concept is also not concerned by "levels", just properties. These properties may be defined, or not, at different levels of investigation. A stronger version has also been proposed: A property A strongly supervenes on a property B whenever each time it's possible to define properties A and B in a framework, no entity could differ in property A without also differing in property B, whatever the framework 2 . This definition will be detailed below. As mentioned in the previous subsection, controversies occur when mixing different notions of causality. As an example, consider a diamond made of carbon atoms. One could say that the diamond supervenes on the carbon atoms: when considering a particular, unique, set of atoms, one must also consider a particular, unique, diamond. No two diamonds may be made of the same atoms: this is material causality. On the other hand, if talking about formal causality, a diamond is generically "made of" a pattern of carbon atoms, and the atoms are all alike so we don't really care which specific atoms are used. A diamond is a specific pattern in carbon atom organization, which distinguishes it from graphite: both could be defined with the exact same atoms, but their organization is what matters. Therefore, the diamond also supervenes on the carbon atom organization: two measurably different diamonds will have a different pattern, two exactly similar diamond, down to the atomic level, will have the same pattern.
But what does it mean to be "the same"? Equivalently, for the purpose of supervenience definition, what does it mean to be "different"? Is a reproduction "the same" as the original? The philosophical controversy arises when one chooses "material causality" or "formal causality" for the notion of identity. Digital objects are more concerned with the formal aspect, famous paintings with the material one, but what about the material reprint of an original digital artwork uniquely printed for a specific exhibit? Then, there is also a functional (social) dimension to take into account.
Compared to the weaker version aforementioned, the stronger version implicitly assumes we can define "the same" properties A and B across different frameworks. Of course, depending on the chosen perspectives for defining sameness in entities and sameness in properties, this stronger version may range from a tautology to a puzzling issue.
Without engaging in the controversy, that is assuming a particular definition for "sameness" has been given for a context, supervenience can then be used. As noted in [3] , supervenience may for example rule out "magic forces" like vitalism, which claimed that the only distinction between a live and a dead entity is due to some "vital force". Since this force is precisely not supposed to depend on the elements composing the dead entity, vitalism is ruled out by supervenience. See also the section about strong emergence below. Supervenience is also reminiscent of the uniqueness theorem for ordinary differential equations: no two distinct trajectories may have the same "initial conditions", that is they cannot cross.
However, in order to prove (or disprove) supervenience, one would need to derive an investigation tool that can precisely identify differences in the chosen properties. In the case of emergence between two levels of investigation, applying supervenience in practice would require measuring the exact state of the lower-level system. This is assuming such measurements do not themselves modify the lower-level state, as is the case in quantum physics. Without such a tool, the only remaining possibility is to accept or reject supervenience as an axiomatic property of the system (which of course does not preclude its usage if it is assumed, see the downward entailment concept below).
Causal reductionism
Causal reductionism is the assumption that every phenomenon, whatever its level of investigation, ultimately have a cause, except possibly axiomatic properties which are postulated. If additionally a unique cause is assumed to have a unique effect (that is, reduction prevents two causes to have the exact same effect), then supervenience holds.
Depending of the causality perspective chosen, causal reductionism has different consequences. Material causal reductionism states in essence that whatever observed complex phenomena, that are always made of matter (broad physical sense), be it an electron stream inside a computer or a magnetic field around the galaxy.
Of course, material reductionists do not reject phenomena like consciousness or social constructs like flash mobs. It's just that stating that a brain and a crowd are made of atoms does not help much in understanding these phenomena, hence material reductionism may not be the best notion to use in these cases.
Formal causality gets around the problem by stating that brains and crowds additionally have an internal structure and governing laws that must be considered. Formal reductionism is then the assumption that such laws can always be found, that any higher-level effect is logically connected to the lower-level formal system. Unfortunately, formal systems are known to be incomplete: No amount of formal causality may satisfyingly encompass all higher-level constructs. If, as pointed out by [8] , such intrinsically logically undecidable higherlevel phenomena are the vast majority of all higher-level statements, then the question becomes whether these statements are really observable or not. Of course, it is still possible to postulate that reality and all higherlevel measurements are logically reducible. Therefore by definition any observer, part of that system, whatever its level of investigation, can only observe logically reducible statements. But even then, the observer may not be able to take advantage of the reduction in any efficient way: this would assume the observer has total knowledge of the underlying rules (which does not generally hold) and that it seeks perfect reconstruction, even for computationally irreducible statements (which is usually not what we want to do). A detailed discussion will be presented in sections 2.6 and 2.7 on related topics. Assuming formal reductionism or not is a matter of principles, and doesn't help much for practical investigations.
Functional causality offers another relation to reductionism. In this setup, higher-level phenomena are defined by their relation (function) with other higher-level phenomena and the environment at that level. But then, functional reductionism is a contradiction, since the function is by definition only a higher-level construct. Another approach is to assume the irreducibility of the function to lower levels and consider only functional causes at the higher level. In that case, reductionism takes the form of assuming every phenomena has a function. But how is this function defined? It is not possible to isolate one part of the system and assign it a function independently of the rest of the system: Dependency loops are inherent to functional causality. A much more elaborated view on self-reference and an introduction to the semantic closure concept can be found in [6] . There may still be dependency chains, which can be given some degree of functional causal power, but as soon as a loop is reached, the reduction argument breaks apart. For that reason, functional causality alone cannot meaningfully be associated with reductionism: there may be reductionism in a system, but then functional causality will not be the only causal relationship in that system. For the next parts of this document, functional irreducibility will refer to the first assumption that a function is only defined at a high level.
The last form of causality mentioned in the previous subsection is the efficient one. Unfortunately, pure efficient causality also suffers from infinite regression. When given an efficient causality chain, one can always backtrack to the proximal cause, without end, so long as one stays purely in efficient causality. To break the chain, one requires another form of causality (like material of formal). But then, the argument falls back to one of the previous points. Aristote broke the argument at the other end of the chain, by stating the entities act according to their finality or purpose, which was relabeled the functional cause in the previous subsection. Once again, we're back to another form of causality. Reductionism is not a meaningful concept in pure efficient causality terms.
Are there other forms of causality one could apply reductionism too? Perhaps, but as previously discussed, these would certainly also come with their own lot of confusion and controversy. Amongst the four forms presented above, the only one that is consistent with reductionism is the material one, and possibly the formal one too by construction or postulate. But as noticed, neither one helps much in understanding the emergence issue in practice: this concept is often associated with a high-level functional definition, as we'll be exposed in the next subsection.
Review of common emergence concepts
Emergence does not mean anything in itself, so long as the concept is not clarified. "Deaf dialogs" may be engaged over whether a phenomenon is emergent or not, if both sides do not consider the same definition. This subsection gathers several emergence concepts, in no particular order. These are mostly definitions to bring into consideration one aspect or another of what "emergence" means. They also provide an illustration of the philosophical elements introduced in the previous subsections. In any case, causality remains the major issue of controversy.
Nominal emergence refers to a global property that cannot be a micro-property. As the etymology suggests, nothing is said about the reason why this happens. In particular, nominal emergence does not refine what are the expected properties for the different levels of investigation. Thus, a nominally emergent phenomenon in a given context might not be considered emergent in another, depending on these contexts particular assumptions. This definition is obviously applicable only in contexts where "agent" and "environment" have a signification. In other words, it is strongly dependent on the definitions chosen for "agent" and "environment". The first two sentences refer to and refine these definitions. Let's assume such a framework as the lower-level. Basic emergence then proposes constitutive and formal reductionism, and a weaker version of functional irreducibility. Constitutive reductionism is clear from the "component" annotation in the definition. Formal reductionism is implicit by the possibility to define what "sum" means at the level of the candidate property, and explicit from [9] . The weaker version of functional irreducibility is due to the problem of clearly specifying what "sum of behavior" formally means, which is acknowledged in [9] . Due to the reliance on prerequisite definitions for both the lower-level (agents, environment) and higher-level (behaviors and their sum), it is difficult to see what the basic emergence notion can bring in practice outside well-defined particular formal systems. It is certainly useful in these contexts to compare explicitly what are the sum and the whole, but would require some adaptation to be applicable to practical data-driven approaches.
Computational emergence is an attribute applicable to other emergence concepts. It implies the existence of a formal system, that usually allows computation theory. Any emergence definition in this context will have the "computational emergence" attribute. This tells nothing about what property the computations and formal aspects should have to be titled "emergent" in the first place, and what other requirements the framework must respect. In particular, this attribute alone does not specify what forms of reducibility are considered, if any.
Thermodynamic emergence refers to thermodynamics and statistics. For example, the nominally emergent concept of temperature could be labeled as thermodynamically emergent. Unfortunately, this just pushes the controversies about causality as to what thermodynamics and physics entail. A point of view is that thermodynamic emergence contrasts with computational emergence [10] , but another point of view is that the universe could be a computational device [11, 12] . The aforementioned discussion about the no locality theorem in quantum physics raises the question as to what is material, what is formal, and with [6] what it means to be measurable. Similarly, opposing point of views on the fundamental nature of noise also lead to controversies. In other words, thermodynamic emergence may seem an attractive concept, but depends on assumptions made about the world.
Open dissipative structures [13] are related to, but more general than, the thermodynamical emergence framework. So long as the underlying assumptions allow for a definition of generic energy, and the system under consideration allows that energy to flow, then entities in that system may "use" this energy. Extensions to this framework are when the entities can store energy and then use that reserve later in time, and when the entities simply use the energy to perpetuate themselves, which then leads to the notion of autonomous structures. Other extensions consider how an autonomous structure may use the output flow in relation to its environment as a mean of action (with the corresponding form of causal relationship). The notion of energy may be abstracted in a functionalist point of view, though of course this extension may or not put open dissipative structures outside the field of thermodynamics depending on the assumptions made about the world. For example, in social contexts, energy may be related to available skills, money, or time; In artificial life contexts energy may be CPU execution slots; In discrete dynamical systems energy may be related to a system state change (and its dissipation would be the fusion of trajectories). Generally speaking, energy is functionally defined by the capacity of the entities in the system to use it. Of course, this lead to a cyclical argument: as detailed in the previous sections purely functional causal chains are self-referent. Either another form of causality is necessary to bring in the energy, or semantic closure can be used as a justification for a separation of the emergent level. The notion of energy may then be used formally in the higher level.
Self-organization is concerned by the internal structure of a system, and how that structure evolves without external intervention. It's not clear at this point what an internal structure means, and how to quantify it. A point of view is that organization opposes entropy, but this brings the problem back to thermodynamics. Another point of view assimilates structure to an amount of information, and use the information theory notion of entropy instead of the thermodynamic notion. Functional definitions are also possible for what is a structure and what is an organization. The Grassberger-Crutchfield-Young [14] statistical complexity indicator is claimed to be an objective measure of self-organization, and it certainly has desirable statistical properties. It relies on a definition of complexity as the amount of information needed for optimal statistical prediction [14] . However, it is unfortunately limited to closed systems, by opposition to open dissipative environments. Defining what self-organization generally means, and especially for an aforementioned autonomous structure, remains an open problem.
Syntactic and semantic emergence are respectively concerned by the formal and functional aspects. As mentioned in the section 2.3, a reductionist framework may possibly be chosen for syntactical emergence. However, semantic emergence is associated with the non-reducible function of a system. Additional assumptions may also be considered related to the higher-level entities, like assumptions about the agents and the environment in the basic emergence case. So, being semantically emergent is possibly not strictly equivalent to being functionally non-reducible in a particular context.
Emergence relative to a model does not consider emergence to be an intrinsic absolute property of a phenomenon, but that it can only be defined by considering this phenomenon with respect to an observer (which could be a formal model for example). It is a functional theory of emergence by giving an account of how new basic functions of the observer -measurements, computations, and controls -can come into being [10] . The observer has predictive capabilities, a formalization of the entities and their functions at the level with which it interacts. Emergence is associated to a divergence between the model formal predictions and what really happens. The case where new observables are necessary to represent new functions in the observer model is called creative emergence, otherwise this is combinatorial emergence 3 .
Surprise of the observer has been proposed as a condition for emergence. The subject is highly controversial, mainly because of different definitions of what "surprise" means. Arguments on the subject may be classified as whether the observer is part of the system (surprise = difference from expectation = emergence relative to the observer internal model of the rest of the system) or whether the observer is independent of the system (in which case surprise and emergence are subjective concepts).
Dynamic and static emergence [3] refer to whether a temporal aspect is respectively necessary or not for the definition of emergence. For example, diamond and graphite exhibit different statically emergent properties of carbon, like the hardness property. Dynamic emergence is stigmergetic when it involves autonomous entities, with an autonomous entity defined as a self-perpetuating region of reduced entropy that is implementing a dissipative structure's abstract design [3] . The abstract design part clearly refers to the formal aspect, the reduced entropy part to thermodynamic emergence at large, which as aforementioned needs some clarification. In the context of [3] , functional irreducibility together with material and formal supervenience are assumed. In addition, a requirement is introduced that the emergent phenomenon may be understood in its own terms and that its understanding does not depend on knowing how it is implemented. This further restricts thermodynamic emergence to functionally irreducible cases, with a formal higher-level system on these functions so they can be understood. But then, semantic closure have to be considered for how these functions and formal system relate to the observer.
Weak, medium and strong emergence will be detailed in the next subsection.
No claim is made on the completeness of this inventory. Other notions certainly exist, the intent is to present the main ones. These definitions are useful to qualify and classify the frameworks we'll apply the practical tools to.
Downward causation and the strength of emergence
Downward causation is the statement that some higher-level construct may exert causal power on the lowerlevel. The controversies are once again associated to what exactly one means by "causal power". In particular, the relations between downward causation and reductionism may lead to heated arguments and non-sense if care is not taken to specify exactly what one means by a causality relationship.
Emmeche et al [5] distinguish between three types of downward causation: strong, medium, and weak. Strong downward causation is the mix of constitutive irreducibility and substantial realism of level. The medium version is the combination of constitutive irreducibility, formal realism, and a refinement detailed below. The weak version is constitutive reductionism, formal realism, and a stronger version of the refinement.
Constitutive irreducibility is another way of saying that material reductionism alone is not enough: The building blocks that make up the higher level are assumed to involve a materially irreducible part. Substantial realism additionally claims that these new building blocks are matter as such, in the broad sense of a part of reality, that is "matter" at the higher levels is the same as "matter" at the lower levels. This amounts to the creation of new fundamental matter (broad sense) ex nihilo. This in turns contradicts supervenience, see the vitalism example in section 2.2. When considering downward causation, these strong requirements additionally state that new entities have material causal powers downward.
Medium downward causation replaces the strong substantial realism requirement by a formal realism one, and adds another requirement detailed below. Formal realism does not mean formal reducibility, it means that unlike the previous case, the material component of the higher level may be only formal elements of the lower one as opposed to material ones. Both requirements are generally accepted so long as these new entities are only considered from that level up, and so long one defines "reality" from the higher-level entities point of view. For example, a simulation could be "real" for the agents in it, the "matter" the agents manipulate is real for them but only formally defined for the lower-level. However downward causation together with formal realism would allow the new higher-level entities to have a formal downward causal power (though not a material one). The higher-level irreducible entities could then modify, restrict, or more generally change in any way, the lower-level formal rules that lead to their apparition. In the above example, this would allow the agents to modify the formal laws of the lower-level, or, to use another example, the mind could change physical laws.
The term strong emergence usually 4 refers either to:
-The first creation of new compositional matter out of nothing.
-The lesser form of creation of new lower-level laws or effects.
-Both at the same time.
For the purpose of this document, strong emergence is equated to considering either one of these properties.
Emmeche et al refine the concept for medium downward causation by adding the requirement of an efficient causality restriction, which includes a temporal restriction. This requirement excludes from medium downward causation any change in the formal laws, together with any back-in-time change in initial conditions. The agents can no longer modify lower system laws in any efficient way, and the mind can no longer change the physical laws. In other words, the higher level entities can only constrain the domain of future possibilities of the system compared to past history, which is reminiscent of the cognitive domain notion as defined by [15] . However, this does not preclude a unique lower-level state to coexist with several different higher-level entities, what Emmeche et al call inverse supervenience.
One could argue that according to formal irreducibility, some phenomena are not logically reducible to lower-level rules and may thus be accepted, or not, with the same lower-level state. Like it's possible to subscribe to the axiom of choice, or not, in ensemble theory. But then, such a phenomena cannot by definition have any downward causal power, which contradicts the downward causation concept.
Another interpretation is given by [5] . By analogy with dynamical systems, the concept of boundary conditions is introduced. Medium downward causation would take the form of an influence of the higher-level concepts on the shape of the phase space, by changing some parameters, or by restricting the boundary to some region. Nevertheless, [5] still does not fully clarifies this inverse supervenience concept: their conclusion ends up with applying dynamical system rules only in a somewhat metaphorical sense.
An additional potential issue with the insertion of that restriction for medium downward causation, is that it excludes some verifiable and reproducible phenomena like the placebo effect. This effect can be seen as a downward efficient causation from the mind on the body. Of course, the downward aspect depends on the perspective chosen for what is the mind, especially what reductionism is assumed or not. In any case, [5] does not pretend to solve all the controversies associated to downward causation, and proposes an interpretation framework that admittedly does not cover all cases.
The weak version of downward causation is not affected by the inverse supervenience problem. As in the previous examples, there are new irreducible higher-level constituents due to formal realism (the question of what form of irreducibility will be explained below). Formal realism also precludes new material effects to appear from these entities at lower-level, as was the case in the strong version. But unlike the previous examples, the constitution or composition of these new higher level entities is assumed fully materially reducible: the matter of the higher level is made of lower-level matter. This eludes the problem of the inverse supervenience of the medium downward causation case, material supervenience holds for weak downward causation. As for the medium case, an additional requirement states that weak downward causation cannot be interpreted as any kind of efficient causation.
So, what can be the non-efficient downward causal power of a fully materially reducible effect on the lower-level? Emmeche et al give an example in terms of attractors of a dynamical system. If some higherlevel concept is identified with being in an attractor basin, arguably functionally irreducible, then the downward causation is associated to the fact that the lower-level variables can only take some values in that basin and not others. The higher-level notion has restricted the lower-level capacities. What's not clear in [5] with respect to weak downward causation is the type of irreducibility it allows. Given that material reducibility is assumed by definition, and given the remarks of section 2.3, we may assume that only a computational or functional irreducibility is possible with weak downward causation (not a formal one). Then, downward causation takes the form of a restriction on the lower-level possibilities. The question is then the extent of this restrictive power.
Weak emergence is defined by Bedau [2] when a higher-level property is underivable except by a full simulation (no shortcut can be found). This framework assumes material and local formal reducibility: The higher-level phenomenon under consideration for weak emergence must be fully reducible to a set of microeffects that is "local". Nothing is said or even implied for other macro-effects using micro-effects outside this set (the system may not be globally formally reducible). Weak emergence is then equivalent to computational irreducibility over that local set. Weak emergence is compatible with the weak downward causation concept form the previous section, and rules out the medium and strong versions.
In [3] Russ Abbott defines another concept, related to downward causation: downward entailment. Downward entailment is an effect that is defined in a framework "functionally irreducible" together with "materially and formally supervenient". Unlike the previous weak downward causation concept by Emmeche et al, the introduction of a requirement about no efficient downward causality is avoided because of supervenience, as will be detailed below.
The combination functionally irreducible / formally supervenient is the one that makes [3] confusing at times. However, there is no contradiction. Abbott takes as an example the Turing machine implementation in the Game of Life. The function performed by a Turing machine is not logically deducible from the game of life rules alone: this requires higher-level concepts, the program and the machine itself. When considered solely as a precise arrangement of game of life cells these concepts make no sense. In other words, the function is irreducible, but the formal aspect is supervenient. The formal aspect of Turing machines and all the computability theory is not reducible to the formal rules of game of life. But the reason is the functional irreducibility that comes in between, otherwise there would be no reason why formal higher-level abstractions should be considered independently of the formal lower-level ones.
Once this issue is clarified, downward entailment amounts to reasoning formally on the higher-level to infer lower-level properties, using negative logic and supervenience. In other words, thanks to the supervenience part of the definition, it's possible to reason on the functional part. What this means is that billiard balls, gliders, Turing Machines, and their interactions can be defined in the abstract. We can reason about them as abstractions, and then through downward entailment we can apply the results of that reasoning to any implementation of those abstractions [3] . The first part is a functional interpretation (billiard ball), with it's associated formal system (reasoning about). Then, thanks to supervenience (any implementation), the results of the higher-level formalism may be propagated to the lower-level. As an example, using Newtonian physics on the billiard ball will put constraints on its lower-level material and formal implementation. This is saying that since no two higher-level balls may have the same lower-level implementation, results about the higherlevel ball must necessarily involve the unique implementation. As in the game of life example aforementioned, the higher and lower levels formal systems are disconnected: Newton laws alone do not apply to individual atoms directly, other effects must be considered (the ball internal cohesion, etc.). Downward entailment, by assuming supervenience, is a way to reconnect the formal systems after they were disconnected by the functional irreducibility.
There are undoubtedly many other possible variations on the subject of downward causation, some are given in [5] . So long as the hypothesis are well-defined, the academic issue is then: Can we test, validate or refute these variations distinctive properties, or are they purely theoretical?
Whatever the acceptable variants on downward causation considered, for the purpose of defining practical investigation tools, finding a way to identify the extent of the limitations imposed by the higher-levels on the lower ones is the only meaningful task that can be accomplished.
Theoretical discussion
Both [2] and [3] insist on the fact there is no intermediate concept between strong emergence and causal reductionism. As was made clear by the previous sections, such a statement requires clarification as to what form of reductionism is considered. In these [2] and [3] cases, material and formal reductionisms are assumed (deriving from a simulation assumes formal reductionism, even if only locally), but not a functional one (that's the whole point of weak emergence). This section presents the case for "functionally and formally irreducible" together with "materially reducible". This precisely forms an intermediate concept, though as we'll see further on, not a particularly useful one. However, according to Chaitin theory of information [8] such concept would in fact be the predominant possibility in practice.
The problem is related to incompleteness of formal systems. Given a sufficiently complex underlying micro-level system, there will be macro-level statements which will not be possible to "prove" or "disprove" using only this micro-level system framework. The question of why and when they are observed in practice is addressed in the next section. This is stronger that weak emergence [2] , in the sense that any simulation of these macro-level effects would represent a logical "proof", hence these macro-levels are not weakly emergent. In other words, if using modern physics as the formal underlying system, there will be statements about reality which we won't be able to theoretically explain, i.e reduce to the formal underlying system. Of course, material reducibility may very well still hold, depending on the physical definition chosen for "material". But our formal equations cannot explain all higher-level observations. As Russ Abbott pointed out [3] , at the lower-level the fundamental forces and particles of physics are already irreducible phenomena we use as axioms for the lower level formalism. According to [8] , at the higher-level, irreducible statements should be much more frequent than the others, reducible ones. This problem is generic, fundamental, and cannot be ignored.
These irreducible statements could at first glance seem to be related to strong emergence. However, they have some crucial properties:
-Their only (formal and functional) consequences are necessarily expressed in "higher-level" terms, whatever that means in a particular context. By definition, if such an irreducible phenomenon could have consequences on the level at which the corresponding statement is defined, then this would negate the unprovability. Ex: the halting problem does not have consequences on the automaton rules themselves. The only consequences in that case are on the higher-level of the "program" and it's execution in time. Of course, the boundary between levels may not be clear, and occasionally, the original formal system may be expanded to new axioms, but then we're really considering another, different, system with it's own higher-level unprovable effects.
-There is no practical way to distinguish between a logically irreducible effect at a higher level, and a logically reducible but computationally irreducible one. These second kind of effects are the weakly emergent ones [2] : The very complex autonomous, self-sustained entity, whose functional definition is linked to other such autonomous higher-level entities and their environment [3] . However, by analogy with information theory [8] , the problem of identifying a particular phenomenon as logically reducible or not is itself undecidable. As a proof sketch, let's consider that one could define an order for the different possible simulations by size, as we could order a formal system statements, and then try all simulations one by one. If we find a simulation that produces the phenomenon, fine, we've proved it is both logically reducible and computationally irreducible (we found the shorter version). Otherwise, there is no way to decide when to stop, there is the possibility a larger simulation produces the desired phenomenon: we can't decide on logical reducibility. Consequently, given a functionally defined higher-level phenomenon, there is no general way to distinguish whether it is formally reducible but incompressible or formally irreducible.
-Given the difficulty to "revert" even simple deterministic chaotic dynamical systems to their initial conditions and evolution rules, even particular cases where we could potentially decide on logical reducibility may be computationally very complex. Not only is it impossible to distinguish between a theoretically logically reducible or not higher-level phenomena in general because this would be undecidable, but even the particular cases for which we could hope to prove reducibility are probably intractable in practice.
What about strong emergence? Either a phenomenon is logically reducible to micro-effects, in which case it is a case of causal reductionism, not a case of strong emergence. Or it is logically irreducible, but then, the first point above is in essence a rejection of the downward causation hypothesis in that case. Therefore, the combination of both logical irreducibility and downward causation is a contradiction: this rules out strong emergence.
What remains are logically irreducible phenomena that do not have any effect at micro-level. But according to the second property above, these are not distinguishable in practice from weakly emergent ones: The problem of deciding whether a particular statement is logically irreducible, or logically reducible but computationally irreducible, is both theoretically undecidable in the general case and practically intractable in most particular cases. So, this explains why previous works using the weak emergence concept still remain valid: Even if irreducible phenomena (logical or computational) would be much more frequent than reducible ones [8] so we probably have already met some, we can't make the distinction in practice.
Pure formal reductionism for all higher-level entities is insufficient in the general case due to incompleteness. Strong emergence was rejected. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the only remaining possibility is the one that was dismissed by both Abbott and Bedau: an intermediate level between formal reductionism and strong emergence. Since it is undecidable whether an observed autonomous entity could be reducible or not, that intermediate level both complements and is indistinguishable from weak emergence. Let's call it formally irreducible emergence, for lack of a better term.
Implications for simulation methods
Weak emergence is not a very useful concept for "understanding" an emergent phenomenon in practice. Of course, assuming we could obtain a simulation equivalent to running the system itself, then possibly we could make predictions if that simulation can be made to run faster than real-time. This is certainly useful, and to a certain extent, this is how we already use numerical simulations, especially in industrial contexts.
However, the full simulation tells nothing about understanding the higher-level phenomenon in itself. This involves amongst other tasks finding a concise (compared to the simulation) micro-to-macro relationship that describes the phenomenon with good accuracy, so our limited human minds may comprehend it 5 . In other words, this amounts to finding a reasonably precise and concise approximation of that phenomenon. A similar argument may be developed for the formally irreducible emergence case, as defined above. Note that many physical laws work this way: we build descriptive laws of motion, heat propagation, etc... that give a reasonable approximation of the corresponding high-level effects. Then part of what we call "noise" includes the variations against this imperfect approximation.
In this view, the debate mentioned in section 2.3 about assuming formal reducibility or not is mostly irrelevant. Let's consider a computer simulation, for example a multi-agent setup. This simulation can be made fully deterministic and reproducible. But even in that case, the system is incomplete, as described in the previous subsection, and some phenomena will not be formally reducible. The question is: Can an observer witness such phenomena, or is this purely a theoretical possibility? In other words, can the simulation produce observable and reproducible phenomena that are irreducible to the simulation program laws?
Let's consider for the purpose of this argument that the observer has total knowledge of the underlying rules, which does not generally hold if the observer is part of the system, but which is reasonable in the case of a programmer examining a computer simulation. Each observed statement could then be perfectly logically reducible, though some statements will be computationally irreducible (no shorter simulation can be found). If what we want to do is finding a shortcut, a concise and reasonably precise law that can describe the observation, then there is no guarantee that the approximation is itself formally reducible. As an example, consider the observer notices some pattern, like points appearing close to a straight line, and we want to derive a law from that observation for the apparition of new points. Then, formal reducibility holds only for the exact position of each point. On the other hand, the "straight line" pattern is a feature that is perhaps neither provable nor disprovable formally given the simulation rules: removing what we consider "noise", the variations of each individual points from the straight line, may put the "straight line" statement outside the scope of the formal system. Moreover, even if there is no noise and the points are observed to be exactly on a line, then this observation is really a mathematical conjecture, with the possibility that this statement is unprovable in this particular formal system.
But the law derived from the observation, the straight line pattern, is very useful for predicting the apparition of new points: That approximation is fast to compute and may satisfyingly avoid the full simulation for the prediction of new points with good accuracy. It is not a "proved" law from the lower-level formal system, but may still be accepted as rule for the higher-level, at least insofar as it gives good results. Once again, this is reminiscent of what happens in physics: higher level prediction laws (like Newtonian physics) are convenient but imperfect shortcuts for the formal system of equations describing interactions at the nanoscale. The normal procedure is then to try to refine the observations so as to validate or invalidate these laws, potentially leading to the creation of new measuring devices, and so on, till we either improve the higher-level "theory" or find a better one for "explaining" the observations. At this point, as before, downward entailment may be a way to reconnect the higher-level formal laws with the lower-level system. The same argument holds and is reinforced when the observer does not have access to the underlying formal rules. This is the case for physics, but this is also the case for most multi-agent simulations where the observer is part of the system (an agent) or when asynchronous communication (a thread, a network link) breaks the reproducibility.
The main implication for computer simulations is that even on a computer, it is possible to observe logically irreducible phenomena, thus formally irreducible emergence as previously defined. This is a counterargument to the formal (logical, causal) reducibility objection to computer simulations: Depending on its setup, a simulation may still be adapted for the study of complex systems and emergence, even formally irreducible ones. Of course, a materially defined version of what is simulated may very well exhibit extra effects. But the interpretation of why such effects may appear depends on the researcher assumptions about the world: A point of view would be that the simulation is not precise enough, and another would be that the simulation cannot theoretically capture all material effects. This subsection argument is not about taking position in that last debate; it is about pointing out that global and formally irreducible effects can be observed even in a formally defined simulation. However, the practical implications are minimal, since as aforementioned it is not possible in general to distinguish between weak and formally irreducible emergence.
Practical investigations
The task of finding a useful approximation usually involves model building and testing. What we can do is collect evidence for micro to macro relationships, and then from these observations try to build a theory. The investigated phenomena may not need to be fully and perfectly described by these models. So long as these models and their associated formal systems reasonably explain and allow predictions with quantifiable errors, then we have hope for some degree of control on these emergent phenomena.
It's been proposed [1] that the problem of model building for emergence is equivalent to and should be addressed by the general scientific methodology of theory building, for each phenomena. In other words, each system should be considered as its own little world, with its peculiar rules, and [1] proposes that we try to build theories about higher-level effects in that little world.
Since this is a daunting task, what is proposed here is to provide tools and methods that may help in these investigations. There are at least two approaches:
• Consider the new level from scratch. Identify sufficiently stable patterns in system state. In the case where a formal system is present, the identification may rely in part on the dynamical system tools and techniques for detecting attractors. But this is not enough, we also need global tools to identify computationally or formally irreducible effects. A qualitative approach may rely simply on observation (subjective tool). A quantitative one may rely on the detection of repeated patterns (machine learning), or it may rely on the premises of a formal system for that new level. In that last case, the goal is to further refine the formal system embryo by identifying the major entities that have a significant role in it. For example, one could start with a crude formal system consisting of the spacial and temporal concentrations of lower-level entities, like agents. This could in turn lead to the identification of groups of agents seemingly "moving" together. This is a first crude concept of a higher-level functional definition for a "group" and an operation "move" on that entity. Then, refinements would consist in defining what exactly that group is, perhaps using pattern matching, what are the laws of motion of that group, group interactions, and so on. Ultimately, a motion theory with formal laws would allow prediction in that system.
• Re-use the observables that already exist to investigate what happens globally, at both the lower and higher levels. For example, in a recurrent network, a high-level measure could be the learning performance. For an evolutionary experiment a global low-level measure could be the gene diversity.
This does not require a formalization of either the lower-level (but it might already exist) and the higher-level (we might have measurements available already). Then, control may be achieved either top-down or bottom-up, by using respectively the global or local measurements to define an objective. In each case, the other measurements provide a way to reach that objective. This approach will be detailed in further sections.
Of course, both are complementary and their combination is probably necessary for understanding micro-tomacro relationships. Once a formalism, or at least entities, can be defined at a level of investigation, global measurements may be made on them. For example, the number of prey/predator cycles in an artificial life system relies on the identification of what is a population cycle. We could then monitor and hopefully relate global measurements on the population cycle with global measurements on the agents themselves.
As for the downward entailment example, functional irreducibility splits the micro and macro level formal systems. The aforementioned population cycle measurement refers to the change in time (formal aspect) of a quantity (the population) that is not defined at the level of the agents and their interaction rules (lower-level formal system). It's important to always refer to these precise effects, and not put the "population cycle" concept is the "emergence" bag. The goal is to define the investigation tools that may help refine the emergence concept, not to presuppose what it means beforehand.
Both quantitative and qualitative investigation tools are necessary to understand what happens in a system. The qualitative tools provide a basis for the definition, and further refinements, of concepts and entities acting at a given level. The quantitative tools may help in formalizing a system of "laws" acting on these entities, which in turn is the basis for a "theory". The goal is to be able to perform some prediction and control on the higher-level entities, if only so as to be able to further improve/refute the candidate theory in progress.
The next section and its subsections review what could be done for the first point: trying to build and formalize entities from scratch, by investigating data and relations at a given level. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will investigate the second point with the 2 different approaches: what can be done by the measurement of a global observables to derive micro-macro relationships (global control), and what can be done at the lower-level to relate it to a global property (local control).
Data-based investigation techniques, starting from scratch

Presentation
This subsection deals with trying to identify entities and their relations with the following assumption: we only have access to some data. The data is collected beforehand. No mention is done about the formal or functional definitions that lead to the observables that were measured (and which provided the data). The approach is pragmatic: from an unknown lower-lever, data was captured. The goal is now to formalize a system at the higher-level consisting of entities and their relations, ultimately forming the basis for a theory at that level.
The term dynamical regime is used to refer to some sufficiently stable pattern in system state. The terminology of an attractor would imply some idea of finitude as well as a reference to dynamical systems. A dynamical regime may be transient, or even not associated to particular underlying equations. In an open and dissipative system, this would describe well some sustained pattern, that is not stable in itself, but which is sufficiently persistent so it can be identified, like a whirlpool.
How to identify a dynamical regime? What aspects of the data can be used in the definition of the regime identifier? The approach proposed in this section is to identify dynamical regimes from data only. This is not to say theoretical values can't be used; actually a theory is needed to compile data in a significant way. What is meant is that the regime identifiers are data-driven, in the sense they don't require extra information about an internal or lower-level model. If such information is available for a particular system, then an extension to this method would be to include it, using Baysian statistics for example.
All we have at this point are observed variables (time series) that can be measured. These series should be modified on-line as new data is observed, and older data should be discarded in the case of transient nonstationary systems. Some form of statistics is necessary: By definition, a dynamical regime is observed through time, individual observations are just the limit case. Thus data should be compiled over a time range if a dynamical regime is to be identified correctly. Too short a range implies the risk of not having enough information to identify the regime. Too long a range implies the risk of compiling data from different regimes with non-stationary effects.
In addition, a choice should be made on which observable to apply the analysis on. This choice will also influence the possibility for local control: the result of a control is described in terms of the chosen observable.
Statistics should be interpreted here in the broad sense of the term: a technique to extract some characteristic value from the data, supposedly depending on the dynamical regime. Thus, contrary to basic mean and variance statistics, the data sequence order is important. Actually, when referring to computational irreducibility, what we're looking for may be related to an approximate algorithmic compression of the data: condensing in a few values the information contained in the sequence of values taken by the observables. The argument about formal reducibility or not was treated in the previous theoretical discussion: For all practical purpose, we don't know whether the data is perfectly compressible or not, but this doesn't matter. The goal is to seek for approximate and simpler to comprehend laws and entities. The compression needs not, and should not, be perfect in our case.
Moreover, due to measurement errors, natural variability in the initial conditions, or simply the sampling mechanism, it is expected that a single dynamical regime leads to different time series anyway. Each of these series only have in common the fact they are generated by the same dynamical regime. But each of these series also contains additional information related to the measurement process, sampling mechanism, etc. This additional information should be discarded as it is not related to the dynamical regime itself. Consequently, what we're seeking here is a way to extract some signature, some relevant information, inherent to this particular dynamical regime, and that distinguishes it from other regimes. This identifier should be robust to the aforementioned effects introducing spurious extra information.
Applicability of data-driven techniques
The goal of this document is not to propose a complete overview of the literature about modeling and time series analysis techniques. This was for example proposed in [16] and [17] . However, recognizing the problematics related to dynamic regime identification is a first step if we intend to solve these problems. In particular, attention should be given to:
-Capturing sequence information. This means finding a way to summarize changes in time of the data, a precondition for identifying time patterns. These patterns relations could then perhaps be used for prediction. For example, times series from an EEG may perhaps lead to the early detection of epilepsy crisis.
-Identifying global trends. This is similar to the seasonal component in weather forecasting. The same measure, like a temperature value of 30°C, will not have the same meaning and predictive impact, according to whether it's in the global trend (ex: in summer, or at the equator) or whether it is anomalous (ex: in winter, or at the poles).
-Resistance to noise. As aforementioned the goal is not to obtain a perfect compression of the data but to get robust and simple indicators of what's going on. Noise is expected, the dynamic regime should be robust to small perturbations.
-On-line incremental updating. The goal is to identify dynamical regimes, which must be updated as new data arrives and older data is discarded. Since dynamic regime identification is only one task that may help in defining observables or formalizing higher-level entities, it is only one step in the full system analysis and must be computationally efficient.
-Maintaining statistical significance, especially when replicating the experiment with different measuring process.
-Finding good observables to apply the techniques to. It's often better to process a synthetic and reliable observable than a thousand noisy data streams. Unfortunately, this is once again a case of cyclic argument: chances are, supposing there exists an ideal regime identifier, that this identifier would itself be the best observable for other techniques.
Combining different techniques may help capturing different informations, like a multifractal analysis [18, 19, 20] provides a different information than a principal component projection [21] , a Lyapunov exponent estimation [17, 22] , etc. Then, an identifier could perhaps be built on top of the various perspectives obtained by different techniques. Global indicators, like the Grassberger-Crutchfield-Young statistical complexity [14, 16] , could also be used when they are applicable. In a given context, some combinations may work better than others. Thus it would be interesting to try different regime identifiers in a local to global problem, by checking the influence on the global patterns. For example, how would including more information improve a learning rate? Alternatively, the combination of different indicators may simply help in extending the coverage of the identifier. Some techniques fail in particular cases: a time-lag embedding may give spurious values due to noise or cycles [23, 24] , a data series may not exhibit a power or an exponential law [17] , etc. Combining different techniques could allow an identifier estimation even if one technique fails. The problem with this idea is to ensure the significance of the identifier in the partial failure case. For example, the information "cycle length" is hard to significantly combine with the information "Lyapunov exponent value". In all subsequent usage of these identifiers the distinction remains. Hence, this is not a combination of techniques at all, but rather a list of cases. In turn, this introduces computational artifacts on the observation of higher-level effects based such lists: The different cases may not be significant at higher-level, but they introduce spurious observations. For example, just because a Lyapunov exponent estimation failed due to noise or lack of data doesn't mean there is no attractor at all.
An on-going field of research concerns the development of new data-based mathematical techniques for time series analysis. Combining the existing ones in a computationally efficient, incremental, and easy to apply way is another challenging task. The dynamic regime identifier could be a first step to search for and define higher-level entities. These techniques could also be introduced in machine learning algorithms so as to automate the definition of global observables. These observables and entities could then be used in a second step for the formalization of higher level governing laws, supposing these laws exist for a given system.
Global control: measuring micro-to-macro relationships
This section relies on the assumption a significant observable can be defined globally for a given level of investigation. In the case a formal system is defined for a lower-level, the observable may be defined in that formal system, possibly using techniques from the previous section. In the case some entity can be functionally defined at a higher-level, then measurements may be made on this entity. For example, the global observable could be a pressure, a population count, etc. The working hypothesis is that global measurements are made at a given level. Whether or not the corresponding observable is in any way reducible to lower-levels is of no concern for this section.
Global control is necessarily related to one form or another of downward causation, the most effective one being downward entailment, as will be detailed below. A target objective is described using the higher-level observable. The goal of global control is to find the extent of the lower-level states that can produce this higher-level observable.
For example, let's consider autonomous entities in a complex simulation, like prey and predator agents. The previous section has dealt with the possibility to create a higher-level formal system from scratch. For example, we could define a global entity like the agent populations. Let's assume we observe prey-predator cycles. We could then try to derive laws for the evolution in time of the populations, that approximate these cycles. Then, given a current observation, we could perhaps predict according to these laws the future global state of the system, or refine the "population theory" that we're building on that system. This section deals with the other possibility: create measurements at global and local levels, and try to relate both. The population observable does not need a complete higher level formal system to be applicable. It can be used as part of the target objective for global control. Other global measurements may be made: on the population diversity, on the agent's lifespan, etc. A target high-level objective is then defined, for example maintaining a diverse population for as long as possible.
At the lower-level, other observables are defined. For example, the amount of energy that flows in the system, some physical limits for the agents, some possibilities for their interactions, and more generally anything that globally influences the lower-level simulation. Conceptually, each higher-level observable can take a range of values that depends on the lower-level parameters. In the simplest case, it can take only one value, and this defines a landscape. In the usual case, each higher-level observable, and their combination, may take a restricted range of values depending in a complex way on the lower-level parameter values.
What's missing now is a set of tools that would help relate both worlds. For example, statistics on aggregation values frequently taken by higher-level observables, bifurcation analysis, and more generally anything that may help understanding the higher-level target behavior, and the shape of the landscape it defines on the lower-level variables in the simplest case.
By analogy with the weak downward causation hypothesis (see section 2.5), the global control would then take the form of a restriction of the domain of the lower-level observables. The allowed range would be the one that maximizes the probability for the higher-level target to be reached (ideally with probability 1 for full control). Given a higher-level objective, the range of lower-level possibilities is limited in a way that is not defined at that lower-level (like a population cycle). The only way to understand why these limitations and no other is to consider the higher-level concepts: this is a form of global control.
The more advanced version of this control is using downward entailment instead of weak downward causation. In this setup, some form of higher-level law has been found that can adequately describe what happens independently of the lower-level, like the hypothetical "population theory" aforementioned, a straight line recurrent pattern, or Newtonian physics to re-use an example from section 2.5. Applying this law would produce some constraints at higher level. The second assumption necessary to apply the downward entailment concept is supervenience. This allows to translate the newly found higher-level constraints in lower-level terms. Unlike the previous example, the lower-level parameters are not changed (or only insofar as the global law remains valid). But once again, the range of lower-level possibilities is limited in a way that can only be understood using higher-level considerations.
To summarize:
-Global control is possible without higher level formalization, but such a formalization would help. Reproducible global measurements need only be well-defined, the "reason" for these measurements and the existence of the entities they involve need not be specified.
-Predictions for the higher-level target is made either by restricting the lower-level parameters range directly, or by using a formal high-level "law" acting on the target. In each case, maximizing the prediction reliability is the goal of global control.
-The result is a limitation of the lower-level parameters and rules that may only be understood in terms of a higher-level concept.
-Tools and techniques that help relating both levels play the same role here as tools and techniques for time series analysis played in the previous section. Therefore, as before, this document is a call for the creation of a battery of ready-to-use tools for investigations.
A simple application of this method in a multi-agent setup was done by the author in [25] . That study relies on the gross simplification consisting in averaging the values of the higher-level observables over multiple runs, so as to define a landscape over lower-level parameters. This is a coarse way to study the micro-macro relationships, but nonetheless allows to apply the first global control technique described in this section, and it has provided concluding results.
Local control: engineering lower-levels
Engineering local control rules and running the system is the most conventional way to proceed. Most experiments concerning emergence try to update the local rules and monitor what happens. Usually they then argue whether the global phenomena is expected or not given the assumptions that were made, or whether it can be considered "emergent" or not, which we'll refrain to do given the discussion in section 2. This subsection is therefore not a new approach to the study of complex systems. However, it is the occasion to highlight a recent change in the way to study them. The dynamical systems point of view is that a higher-level phenomena could possibly be related to internal state attractors. This idea was previously expressed in the discussion about weak downward causation. Recent studies like [26] show that the "attractor = higher level state" concept is no longer enough. Studies like [26, 27] place attractors and their length as just another parameter that changes, and attractor shifts due to noise are an essential part of the investigation. In the context of the previous section, this could even provide an observable for the global state of the system.
In the "large noisy networks with ever-changing attractors view", a dynamical regime would not be associated to one attractor (or sustained cycle), but rather to some global property, with attractors just a component of that global property. It's still possible to use the dynamical regime concept, but it has become less grounded in the attractor or sustained state terminology. Moreover, more attention is given to the higherlevel functional aspect at the expense of the lower-level formal aspect.
The complex systems are still the same, but the way to investigate them has changed. Instead of trying to characterize attractors, Lyapunov exponents, and other dynamical system notions, the attention is now on global statistical properties and measurements. Consequently, the attention shifts from the "far from equilibrium" part to the "thermodynamics" part, to reuse the notions presented in section 2.
An example of this shift of attention is the Liquid State Machine (LSM) random recurrent neural network as defined by [28] , which has been shown to be able to compute without stable state [29] . This contrasts with the previous generation of neural networks, for example multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), where the goal was precisely to make the network converge to a stable state. The LSM comprises hundred or thousands of nodes, and their recurrent feedback loops are an essential part of the system. The MLP were generally limited to a few tens of nodes, and the feed-forward without recurrent loop aspect was important to prove the convergence analytically. In the LSM setup, the fading memory property [26] assumes the role of the dissipative part of the system. The openness comes from the assumption external energy is available to emit spikes, which by definition are short impulses of energy higher than the rest state. The LSM is then continuously in a sustained state. The MLP were equivalent to a dissipative discrete dynamical system, with sigmoidal transfer functions from one state to the next.
Another reason for recent advances seems to be simply the increase of available computing power. When we could only study simple dynamical systems, the precise equation properties, attractors, bifurcations and so on were the main objects of study. Now, all these are acquired parts, not the center of attention. For example, being able to simulate ten thousand times more nodes in a neural network drastically changes the view of what "dynamic" and "large" means. Some effects are only visible at large scales, like the error rate dropping below a few percents only when the network size is above several hundred nodes [28] . The same way some mathematical properties only appear in higher dimensions, it seems that some properties of the system states only appear in high dimensions. Except for specific particular cases, it's then not practically possible to proceed to a formal analysis.
Local control is still possible, but once again new tools and techniques should be invented or at least existing ones should be adapted. As for the time series and the micro-macro analysis tools aforementioned, this section is a call for qualitative and quantitative tools to statistically describe large scale behaviors. This could be a synthetic parameter, like an order/chaos boundary indicator [30] , an average attractor length [27] , a degree of synchronization, etc.
An example of local control is provided by the author in [31] : Each node dynamical regime in a LSM is monitored, and then a learning algorithm is derived using these local regime synchronization, in a way reminiscent of Hebbian learning [32] .
Conclusion
There is currently no consensus about what the notion of "emergence" entails. The most plausible explanation is that no objective notion of "emergence" matching our intuition can be found. Conversely, any comprehensive theory of emergence will have counter-intuitive results.
Thinking in terms of causality and irreducibility helps to clarify the main concepts, as well as to avoid controversies between supporters of different definitions, assumptions and hypothesis that lead to different interpretations. It doesn't seem at this point reasonable or even possible to build a theory of complex systems based only on theoretical arguments.
The conclusion for this analysis is a clear call for the creation of practical investigation tools. It's been proposed in [1] that in general the problem of emergence in a given system is equivalent to the problem of building a theory for that system. That is, consider the system as its own little world with its own rules, and try to formalize laws and entities in this world. Then, using these laws and entities, one could hope to achieve some degree of prediction, if only so as to refine the system-specific theory, and some degree of control, for example through downward entailment.
Such an approach certainly seems to be successful already for some systems like the Game of Life, where a vast community of enthusiasts has created a bestiary of existing entities, what's known about interaction rules, and more 6 . In a sense, the discovery of Turing equivalence for the game of life could not have been possible without first thinking in terms of entities like the gliders and their interactions. The question is, could this be generalized to other frameworks? Could we try to formalize and build a higher-level theory for each complex system? If so, could some common investigation tools and techniques help in this daunting task?
In this perspective, the following guideline is proposed:
• Monitor micro-level and macro-level behaviors. Define observables that globally describe each level.
• Using the quantifiers, try to find relations. As said in [1] , this step is equivalent to theory building for a particular system: there is no magic recipe. This is where reliable investigation tools are an invaluable resource.
• If such micro-to-macro level relationships are found, then there is hope to derive "laws", or shortcuts, that may reasonably provide some degree of prediction and control over emergence. These laws need not be perfect, and in fact in the case of weak and formally irreducible emergence they cannot be so. They need only provide a satisfyingly good approximation for a given problem. In that case, as for any sound scientific theory, refutable predictions should be made with that theory so as to direct further refinements: What Kuhn [33] calls normal science.
• Using either the higher-level formal system embryo or the quantifiers directly, apply some control on the system. If control is sought at the lower level, use the higher-level observables to monitor its effect. This is the most common case. But it's also possible to define functionally a higher-level objective function, and restrict, search, manipulate, or optimize the lower-level parameters so as to reach that objective.
In turn, this raises the question as to how to monitor a system. At this point, it seems reasonable to apply a data-driven approach for the measurements, possibly complemented by the lower-level formal system or the higher-level on-going formalization. One goal is direct control, the other is to further refine the entities and higher-level formal system, if only to be able to improve the measurements quality, which in turn could lead to more control.
Tools and techniques that may help in these investigations fall in three categories:
-Tools for relating micro-macro relationships.
-Synthetic indicators for the system global behavior at each scale.
-Dynamic regime identification, especially for the observables defined by such synthetic indicators.
Historically, the development of instruments for measuring the world has been a driving force behind theoretical refinements. There is no reason to think complexity science is different, and better practical tools will lead to better understanding. Although the mathematical development of new tools would be welcome, improving the implementation of these tools and the currently existing ones is a necessity. If ninety percent of the computation time is spent on the measurement process, then there is little room left for applying these instruments to anything in practice. What we need is an efficient and ready-to-use toolbox for making measures, investigating what happens, and help building theories. This can be seen as an help for the scientific formalization of laws and theories about a given system. This document is therefore a call for a pragmatic, practical approach to complex systems, as well as a call to create generic tools of investigation.
